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2
Control of Corruption
The ”Control of Corruption” estimate measures perceptions of corruption, conventionally defined
as the exercise of public power for private gain. The particular aspect of corruption measured
by the various sources differs somewhat, ranging from the frequency of ”additional payments to
get things done”, to the effects of corruption on the business environment, to measuring ”grand
corruption” in the political arena or in the tendency of elite forms to engage in ”state capture”.
Clarifications:
The estimate goes from -2.5 to 2.5, where lower values indicate less control of corruption, and
higher values a better control.
Source: The World Bank Group
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/
(Downloaded on 2018-09-24)
Dataset: The Worldwide Governance Indicators These indicators are based on several
hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 31 separate data
sources constructed by 25 different organizations. These individual measures of governance are
assigned to categories capturing key dimensions of governance. An unobserved component model
is used to construct six aggregate governance indicators. Point estimates of the dimensions of
governance, the margins of error as well as the number of sources are presented for each country.
The governance estimates are normally distributed with a mean of zero and a standard deviation
of one each year of measurement. This implies that virtually all scores lie between -2.5 and 2.5,
with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes.
WARNING: Since the estimates are standardized (with a mean of zero and a standard devia-
tion of one) each year of measurement, they are not directly suitable for over-time comparisons
within countries. Kaufmann et al. (2006) however find no systematic time-trends in a selection of
indicators that do allow for comparisons over time, which suggests that time-series information in
the WBGI scores can be used if interpreted with caution.
3
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
Andorra
Azerbaijan
Australia
Austria
Bahamas
Bahrain
Barbados
Belgium
Bhutan
Botswana
Brazil
Brunei
Bulgaria
Canada
Chad
Chile
China
Congo
Cuba
Cyprus
Denmark
Dominica
Equatorial Guinea
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Greece
Grenada
Guinea
Iceland
India
IranIraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
South Korea
Kuwait
Laos Lesotho
Latvia
Libya
Luxembourg
Malaysia
Mali
MauritiusMexico
Moldova
Morocco
Oman
Namibia
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nigeria
Norway
Micronesia
Peru
Poland
Portugal
Guinea−Bissau
Qatar
Romania
Russia
Rwanda
St Lucia
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
Vietnam
Slovenia
South Africa
Zimbabwe
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Arab Emirates
Tunisia
Turkey
U.K.
Tanzania
U.S.A.
Uruguay
Venezuela
Yemen
High
Low
HighLow
0
30000
60000
90000
−2 −1 0 1 2
 Control of Corruption
G
D
P
 
p
e
r
 
C
a
p
i
t
a
 
(
c
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
 
2
0
1
0
 
U
S
 
D
o
l
l
a
r
)
 
GDP per Capita (constant 2010 US Dollar) vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations:  184 
R−Squared:  0.59 
Sources:  The World Bank Group (2014 − 2017) &  The World Bank Group (2017)
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GINI Index (World Bank Estimate) vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations:  91 
R−Squared:  0.12 
Sources:  The World Bank Group (2014 − 2017) &  The World Bank Group (2017)
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Economic Freedom Index vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations:  178 
R−Squared:  0.51 
Sources:  Heritage Foundation (2015 − 2017) &  The World Bank Group (2017)
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GDP per Capita Growth (annual %) vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations:  186 
R−Squared:  0.02 
Sources:  The World Bank Group (2014 − 2017) &  The World Bank Group (2017)
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Sources:  Ease of Doing Business Report (DB17−19 methodology) (2017) &  The World Bank Group (2017)
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Number of observations:  187 
R−Squared:  0.51 
Sources:  United Nations Development Program (2017) &  The World Bank Group (2017)
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Good Society Index vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations:  57 
R−Squared:  0.52 
Sources:  Holmberg, 2007. Made with data from: World Value Survey (Happiness) and World Development Indicators (Life Expectancy and Infant Mortality)
 (2014 − 2017) &  The World Bank Group (2017)
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Government Revenue (percent of GDP) vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations:  164 
R−Squared:  0.19 
Sources:  International Monetary Fund (2014 − 2015) &  The World Bank Group (2017)
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Tax Revenue (% of GDP) vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations:  129 
R−Squared:  0.13 
Sources:  The World Bank Group (2014 − 2017) &  The World Bank Group (2017)
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Average Schooling Years vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations:  142 
R−Squared:  0.40 
Sources:  Barro & Lee (2010) &  The World Bank Group (2017)
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School Enrolment (Tertiary) vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations:  134 
R−Squared:  0.31 
Sources:  The World Bank Group (Ratio of total enrolment) (2014 − 2017) &  The World Bank Group (2017)
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Life Expectancy at Birth, Total (years) vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations:  184 
R−Squared:  0.45 
Sources:  The World Bank Group (2016) &  The World Bank Group (2017)
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Healthy Life Expectancy vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations:  183 
R−Squared:  0.45 
Sources:  World Health Organization (2016) &  The World Bank Group (2017)
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Mortality Rate, Infant (per 1,000 Live Births) vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations:  190 
R−Squared:  0.36 
Sources:  The World Bank Group (2017) &  The World Bank Group (2017)
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Risk of Maternal Death (%) vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations:  181 
R−Squared:  0.22 
Sources:  The World Bank Group (2015) &  The World Bank Group (2017)
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Public Health Expenditure (% of GDP) vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations:  183 
R−Squared:  0.42 
Sources:  The World Bank Group (2014 − 2015) &  The World Bank Group (2017)
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Private Health Expenditure (% of health exp.) vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations:  183 
R−Squared:  0.24 
Sources:  The World Bank Group (2014 − 2015) &  The World Bank Group (2017)
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Alcohol Consumption per Capita vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations:  177 
R−Squared:  0.28 
Sources:  World Health Organization (2015 − 2016) &  The World Bank Group (2017)
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CO2 Emissions (metric tons per Capita) vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations:  190 
R−Squared:  0.13 
Sources:  The World Bank Group (2014) &  The World Bank Group (2017)
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Access To Drinking Water vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations:  180 
R−Squared:  0.40 
Sources:  Environmental Performance Index  (2015) &  The World Bank Group (2017)
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Unsafe Sanitation vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations:  180 
R−Squared:  0.28 
Sources:  Environmental Performance Index  (2015) &  The World Bank Group (2017)
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Gender Equality Index vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations:  186 
R−Squared:  0.49 
Sources:  United Nations Development Programme (2017) &  The World Bank Group (2017)
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Female School Enrolment (Secondary) vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations:  150 
R−Squared:  0.43 
Sources:  The World Bank Group (Ratio of total enrolment) (2014 − 2017) &  The World Bank Group (2017)
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Total Police Personnel (per 100,000 Pop.) vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations:  74 
R−Squared:  0.01 
Sources:  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2014 − 2015) &  The World Bank Group (2017)
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Homicide Rate (per 100,000 Pop.) vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations:  133 
R−Squared:  0.08 
Sources:  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2014 − 2015) &  The World Bank Group (2017)
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Organized Crime vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations:  139 
R−Squared:  0.43 
Sources:  World Economic Forum (2017) &  The World Bank Group (2017)
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Road Traffic Death Rate (per 100,000 Pop.) vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations:  187 
R−Squared:  0.40 
Sources:  World Health Organization (2013) &  The World Bank Group (2017)
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Most People Can Be Trusted vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations:  58 
R−Squared:  0.22 
Sources:  World Values Survey (2010 − 2014) &  The World Bank Group (2017)
31
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
Algeria Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Belarus
Brazil
Chile
China
Colombia
Cyprus
Ecuador
Egypt
Estonia
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
India
Iraq
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
South Korea
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Lebanon
Libya
Malaysia
Mexico
Morocco Netherlands
New Zealand
Nigeria
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Qatar
Romania
Russia
Rwanda
Singapore
Slovenia
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Taiwan
Thailand
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Ukraine
U.S.A.
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Yemen
Zimbabwe
High
Low
HighLow
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
−1 0 1 2
 Control of Corruption
C
o
n
f
i
d
e
n
c
e
 
i
n
 
P
a
r
l
i
a
m
e
n
t
 
Confidence in Parliament vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations:  58 
R−Squared:  0.01 
Sources:  World Values Survey (2010 − 2014) &  The World Bank Group (2017)
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Confidence in Parliament vs. Control of Corruption in Democracies
Number of observations:  28 
Adjusted R−Squared:  0.21 
Sources:  World Values Survey (2010 − 2014) & The World Bank Group (2017). Democracies are understood as countries with more than 0.6 in V−Dem's 
electoral democracy.
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Feeling of Happiness vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations:  58 
R−Squared:  0.01 
Sources:  World Values Survey (2010 − 2014) &  The World Bank Group (2017)
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Satisfaction with Life vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations:  58 
R−Squared:  0.05 
Sources:  World Values Survey (2010 − 2014) &  The World Bank Group (2017)
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Number of observations:  116 
Adjusted R−Squared:  0.9 
Sources:  The World Bank Group
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Government Effectiveness vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations:  192 
R−Squared:  0.81 
Sources:  The World Bank Group (2017) &  The World Bank Group (2017)
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Electoral Democracy Index vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations:  171 
R−Squared:  0.44 
Sources:  Varieties of Democracy (V−Dem) Project (2017) &  The World Bank Group (2017)
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Freedom on the Net Score vs. Control of Corruption
Number of observations:  65 
R−Squared:  0.27 
Sources:  Freedom House (2017) &  The World Bank Group (2017)
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Description of Variables by Source
Barro & Lee
http://www.barrolee.com/
(Downloaded on 2018-07-13)
Dataset: Educational Attainment Dataset The Barro-Lee Data set provide data disaggre-
gated by sex and by 5-year age intervals. It provides educational attainment data for 146 countries
in 5-year intervals from 1950 to 2010. It also provides information about the distribution of ed-
ucational attainment of the adult population over age 15 and over age 25 by sex at seven levels
of schooling - no formal education, incomplete primary, complete primary, lower secondary, upper
secondary, incomplete tertiary, and complete tertiary. Average years of schooling at all levels -
primary, secondary, and tertiary - are also measured for each country and for regions in the world.
Aside from updating and expanding our previous estimates (1993, 1996, and 2001), we improve
the accuracy of estimation in the current version by using more information and better method-
ology. To reduce measurement error, the new estimates are constructed using recently available
census/survey observations from consistent census data, disaggregated by age group, and new es-
timates of mortality rate and completion rate by age and by education.
Average Schooling Years, Female and Male (25+) Average Schooling Years, Female and
Male (25+).
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United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
https://data.unodc.org/
(Downloaded on 2018-12-04)
Dataset: Crime and Criminal Justice The UN-CTS deals with information, primarily ad-
ministrative statistics, on the main components of the criminal justice system (police, prosecution,
courts and prisons). In addition, the UN-CTS collects available data from crime victimization
surveys.
Intentional homicide rate (per 100,000 pop.) Intentional homicide, counts and rates per
100,000 population. Unlawful death purposefully inflicted on a person by another person. Data
on intentional homicide should also include serious assault leading to death and death as a result
of a terrorist attack. It should exclude attempted homicide, manslaughter, death due to legal
intervention, justifiable homicide in self-defence and death due to armed conflict.
For Belgium and Romania, the refer to offences, not victims, of intentional homicide. For New
Zealand, the data for 2000-2006 refer to offences, data for 2007 onwards refer to victims of inten-
tional homicide. The data for Kazakhstan, the Philippines and Sri Lanka reports a change in the
definition and(or) counting rules and it entails a break in the time series.
Total police personnel at national level (per 100,000 pop.) Total police personnel at na-
tional level per 100,000 population. personnel in public agencies as at 31 December whose principal
functions are the prevention, detection and investigation of crime and the apprehension of alleged
offenders. Data concerning support staff (secretaries, clerks, etc.) should be excluded. Data sup-
plied by countries may not exactly reflect the definition provided.
Argentina, Burundi, Colombia, Estonia, Latvia, Mexico, Netherlands, Paraguay, Russia, Serbia
and Thailand reported changes in definitions and/or counting rules are reported by the Member
State to indicate a break in the time series.
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Ease of Doing Business Report
http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/doingbusiness
(Downloaded on 2018-11-01)
Dataset: Ease of Doing Business - Historical Data The Doing Business project provides
objective measures of business regulations and their enforcement across 190 economies. This EOB
2019 report covers 11 indicator sets and 190 economies. Most indicator sets refer to a case scenario
in the largest business city of each economy, except for 11 economies that have a population of more
than 100 million as of 2013 (Bangladesh, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria,
Pakistan, the Russian Federation and the United States) where Doing Business, also collected data
for the second largest business city.
The ease of doing business score captures the gap between an economy’s performance and a
measure of best practice across the entire sample of 41 indicators for 10 Doing Business topics
(the labor market regulation indicators are excluded). For starting a business, for example, New
Zealand and Georgia have the lowest number of procedures required (1). New Zealand also holds
the shortest time to start a business (0.5 days), while Slovenia has the lowest cost (0.0).
Calculating the ease of doing business score for each economy involves two main steps. In the
first step individual component indicators are normalized to a common unit where each of the 41
component indicators y (except for the total tax and contribution rate) is rescaled using the linear
transformation (worst - y)/(worst - best). In this formulation, the highest score represents the
best regulatory performance on the indicator across all economies since 2005 or the third year in
which data for the indicator were collected.
Both the best regulatory performance and the worst regulatory performance are established ev-
ery five years based on the Doing Business data for the year in which they are established and
remain at that level for the five years regardless of any changes in data in interim years. Thus, an
economy may establish the best regulatory performance for an indicator even though it may not
have the highest score in a subsequent year. Conversely, an economy may score higher than the
best regulatory performance if the economy reforms after the best regulatory performance is set.
For example, the best regulatory performance for the time to get electricity is set at 18 days. In
the Republic of Korea it now takes 13 days to get electricity while in the United Arab Emirates it
takes just 10 days. Although the two economies have different times, both economies score 100 on
the time to get electricity because they have exceeded the threshold of 18 days.
For scores such as those on the strength of legal rights index or the quality of land adminis-
tration index, the best regulatory performance is set at the highest possible value (although no
economy has yet reached that value in the case of the latter).
Due to the changes in methodologies, some variables are presented separately, given that they
are not comparable given these said changes.
Ease of doing business score global (DB17-19 methodology) Ease of doing business score
global (DB17-19 methodology)
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Environmental Performance Index
http://epi.yale.edu/downloads
(Downloaded on 2018-11-20)
Dataset: Environmental Performance Index Data The Environmental Performance Index
provides a ranking that shines light on how each country manages environmental issues. The
Environmental Performance Index (EPI) ranks how well countries perform on high-priority envi-
ronmental issues in two broad policy reas: protection of human health from environmental harm
and protection of ecosystems. Within these two policy objectives the EPI scores country perfor-
mance in nine issue areas comprised of 20 indicators. Indicators in the EPI measure how close
countries are to meeting internationally established targets or, in the absence of agreed-upon tar-
gets, how they compare to the range of observed countries.
Note: In many cases the EPI variables lack actual observations and rely on imputation. Please
refer to the original documentation on more information about this. Also, some values (usually
the value 0) are very unlikely, please use your judgement whether to treat these as the value 0 or
as ”Data missing”.
Unsafe Sanitation Exposure to unsafe sanitation and population lacking access to sanitation.
Access to Drinking Water Population lacking access to drinking water
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Freedom House
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/freedom-net-2017
(Downloaded on 2018-11-13)
Dataset: Freedom on the Net Freedom on the Net is a Freedom House project consisting
of cutting-edge analysis, fact-based advocacy, and on-the-ground capacity building. It features
a ranked, country-by-country assessment of online freedom, a global overview of the latest de-
velopments, as well as in depth country reports. Freedom on the Net measures the subtle and
not-so-subtle ways that governments and non-state actors around the world restrict our intrinsic
rights online. Each country assessment includes a detailed narrative report and numerical score,
based on methodology developed in consultation with international experts. This methodology
includes three categories:
1. Obstacles to Access details infrastructural and economic barriers to access, legal and own-
ership control over internet service providers , and independence of regulatory bodies;
2. Limits on Content analyzes legal regulations on content, technical filtering and blocking of
websites, self-censorship, the vibrancy/diversity of online news media, and the use of digital tools
for civic mobilization;
3. Violations of User Rights tackles surveillance, privacy, and repercussions for online speech and
activities, such as imprisonment, extralegal harassment, or cyberattacks.
Freedom on the Net is a collaborative effort between a small team of Freedom House staff and an
extensive network of local researchers and advisors in 65 countries.
Freedom on the Net: Score Freedom on the Net, Score: Measures the subtle and not-so-subtle
ways that governments and non-state actors around the world restrict our intrinsic rights online
by looking at Obstacles to Access, Limits on Content and Violations of User Rights. The scores
are usually based on a scale of 0 to 100 with 0 representing the best level of freedom on the net
progress and 100 the worst. For this publication, 0 represent the lowest freedom and 100 the highest.
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United Nations Development Programme
http://hdr.undp.org/en/data
(Downloaded on 2018-12-04)
Dataset: Human Development Report The Gender Inequality Index (GII) reflects gender-
based disadvantage in three dimensions—reproductive health, empowerment and the labour mar-
ket—for as many countries as data of reasonable quality allow. It shows the loss in potential
human development due to inequality between female and male achievements in these dimensions.
It ranges from 0, where women and men fare equally, to 1, where one gender fares as poorly as
possible in all measured dimensions.
Gender Inequality Index The GII is an inequality index. It measures gender inequalities in
three important aspects of human development—reproductive health, measured by maternal mor-
tality ratio and adolescent birth rates; empowerment, measured by proportion of parliamentary
seats occupied by females and proportion of adult females and males aged 25 years and older with
at least some secondary education; and economic status, expressed as labour market participation
and measured by labour force participation rate of female and male populations aged 15 years and
older. The GII is built on the same framework as the IHDI—to better expose differences in the
distribution of achievements between women and men. It measures the human development costs
of gender inequality. Thus the higher the GII value the more disparities between females and males
and the more loss to human development.
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Heritage Foundation
http://www.heritage.org/index/explore
(Downloaded on 2018-07-17)
Dataset: Index of Economic Freedom The Index of Economic Freedom covers 10 freedoms
- from property rights to entrepreneurship - in 186 countries.
Note: For the 2015, most data covers the second half of 2013 through the first half of 2014.
To the extent possible, the information considered for each factor was current as of June 30, 2014.
It is important to understand that some factors are based on historical information. For example,
the monetary policy factor is a 3-year weighted average rate of inflation from January 1, 2011, to
December 31, 2013.
Economic Freedom Index The Economic Freedom index uses 10 specific freedoms, some as
composites of even further detailed and quantifiable components:
- Business freedom
- Trade freedom
- Fiscal freedom
- Freedom from government
- Monetary freedom
- Investment freedom
- Financial freedom
- Property rights
- Freedom from corruption
- Labor freedom.
Each of these freedoms is weighted equally and turned into an index ranging from 0 to 100,
where 100 represents the maximum economic freedom. Although changes in methodology have
been undertaken throughout the measurement period, continuous backtracking has been used to
maximize comparability over time.
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International Monetary Fund
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/01/weodata/index.aspx
(Downloaded on 2018-12-04)
Dataset: World Economic Outlook Database The World Economic Outlook (WEO) database
contains selected macroeconomic data series from the statistical appendix of the World Economic
Outlook report, which presents the IMF staff’s analysis and projections of economic developments
at the global level, in major country groups and in many individual countries. The WEO is re-
leased in April and September/October each year. Use this database to find data on national
accounts, inflation, unemployment rates, balance of payments, fiscal indicators, trade for countries
and country groups (aggregates), and commodity prices whose data are reported by the IMF. Data
are available from 1980 to the present, and projections are given for the next two years. Addition-
ally, medium-term projections are available for selected indicators. For some countries, data are
incomplete or unavailable for certain years.
Government revenue (Percent of GDP) Government revenue (% of GDP). Revenue consists
of taxes, social contributions, grants receivable, and other revenue. Revenue increases government’s
net worth, which is the difference between its assets and liabilities (GFSM 2001, paragraph 4.20).
Note: Transactions that merely change the composition of the balance sheet do not change the net
worth position, for example, proceeds from sales of nonfinancial and financial assets or incurrence
of liabilities.
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So¨ren Holmberg
https://qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1551/1551579 2014 13 holmberg rothstein.pdf
Dataset: Good Society Index The Good Society Index builds on three basic premises. First,
the index consists of birth and deaths of human beings as well as the quality of life of people. The
second premise is that the Good Society Index should adhere to lex parsimoniae, that is to the
principle of Ockham’s razor, meaning that a model should use a minimum number of explanatory
variables. Third, the index measures subjective as well as objective characteristics. Subjective
and objective indicators need to be combined, neither is sufficient as of its own. Given these three
premises the Good Society Index is operationally constructed using:
- Infant mortality data from the World Bank (World Development Indicators) (2017)
- Life expectancy data from the World Bank (World Development Indicators) (2016)
- Feeling of Happiness (World Values Survey) (2010-2014)
The three indicators all carry the same weight. Furthermore, the index is based on ranks, not on
rates, which means that the countries’ rank orders are utilized to build the composite index. The
rank orders of each country have been summed and divided by three to yield an index value that
in theory can vary between 1 (top nation on the Good Society Index) and 149 (bottom country).
A top index value of 1 and a bottom value of 149 thus tell us that these specific countries are
closest and furthest away respectively from the good society among the investigated nations. But
the figures do not tell how close or how far away from the maximum good society the countries
are. The index is not continuous; it is a rank order scale. (Holmberg, 2007)
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United Nations Development Program
http://hdr.undp.org/en/data
(Downloaded on 2018-11-14)
Dataset: Human Development Report The Human Development Report (HDR) is an an-
nual report published by the Human Development Report Office of the United Nations Develop-
ment Programme (UNDP).
The entire series of Human Development Index (HDI) values and rankings are recalculated every
year using the same the most recent (revised) data and functional forms. The HDI rankings and
values in the 2014 Human Development Report cannot therefore be compared directly to indices
published in previous Reports. Please see hdr.undp.org for more information.
The HDI was created to emphasize that people and their capabilities should be the ultimate cri-
teria for assessing the development of a country, not economic growth alone. The HDI can also be
used to question national policy choices, asking how two countries with the same level of GNI per
capita can end up with different human development outcomes.
Human Development Index The HDI was created to emphasize that people and their capabili-
ties should be the ultimate criteria for assessing the development of a country, not economic growth
alone. The HDI can also be used to question national policy choices, asking how two countries
with the same level of GNI per capita can end up with different human development outcomes.
These contrasts can stimulate debate about government policy priorities.
The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure of average achievement in key di-
mensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent
standard of living. The HDI is the geometric mean of normalized indices for each of the three
dimensions.
The health dimension is assessed by life expectancy at birth, the education dimension is measured
by mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and more and expected years of schooling
for children of school entering age. The standard of living dimension is measured by gross national
income per capita. The HDI uses the logarithm of income, to reflect the diminishing importance of
income with increasing GNI. The scores for the three HDI dimension indices are then aggregated
into a composite index using geometric mean. Refer to Technical notes for more details.
The HDI simplifies and captures only part of what human development entails. It does not reflect
on inequalities, poverty, human security, empowerment, etc. The HDRO offers the other compos-
ite indices as broader proxy on some of the key issues of human development, inequality, gender
disparity and human poverty.
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Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project
https://v-dem.net/en/data/
(Downloaded on 2018-07-09)
Dataset: Varieties of Democracy Dataset version 8 Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) is a
new approach to conceptualizing and measuring democracy. It is a collaboration among more than
50 scholars worldwide which is co-hosted by the Department of Political Science at the University
of Gothenburg, Sweden; and the Kellogg Institute at the University of Notre Dame, USA.
Electoral Democracy Index This index is based on the question: To what extent is the ideal
of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved?
Clarifications: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to embody the core value of making
rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate’s approval
under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate
freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect
the composition of the chief executive of the country. In between elections, there is freedom of
expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative views on matters of politi-
cal relevance. In the VDem conceptual scheme, electoral democracy is understood as an essential
element of any other conception of (representative) democracy - liberal, participatory, deliberative,
egalitarian, or some other. Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the average of, on the one
hand, the sum of the indices measuring freedom of association (thick), suffrage, clean elections,
elected executive (de jure) and freedom of expression; and, on the other, the five-way interaction
between those indices. This is half way between a straight average and strict multiplication, mean-
ing the average of the two. It is thus a compromise between the two most well known aggregation
formulas in the literature, both allowing ”compensation” in one sub-component for lack of pol-
yarchy in the others, but also punishing countries not strong in one sub-component according to
the ”weakest link” argument. The aggregation is done at the level of Dahls sub-components (with
the one exception of the non-electoral component).
The World Bank Group
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/
(Downloaded on 2018-09-24)
Dataset: The Worldwide Governance Indicators These indicators are based on several
hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 31 separate data
sources constructed by 25 different organizations. These individual measures of governance are
assigned to categories capturing key dimensions of governance. An unobserved component model
is used to construct six aggregate governance indicators. Point estimates of the dimensions of
governance, the margins of error as well as the number of sources are presented for each country.
The governance estimates are normally distributed with a mean of zero and a standard deviation
of one each year of measurement. This implies that virtually all scores lie between -2.5 and 2.5,
with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes.
WARNING: Since the estimates are standardized (with a mean of zero and a standard devia-
tion of one) each year of measurement, they are not directly suitable for over-time comparisons
within countries. Kaufmann et al. (2006) however find no systematic time-trends in a selection of
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indicators that do allow for comparisons over time, which suggests that time-series information in
the WBGI scores can be used if interpreted with caution.
Government Effectiveness, Estimate Government Effectiveness - Estimate: ”Government Ef-
fectiveness” combines into a single grouping responses on the quality of public service provision,
the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil
service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies.
The main focus of this index is on ”inputs” required for the government to be able to produce and
implement good policies and deliver public goods.
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The World Bank Group
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators
(Downloaded on 2018-10-05)
Dataset: World Development Indicators The primary World Bank collection of develop-
ment indicators, compiled from officially-recognized international sources. // This is an adaptation
of an original work by The World Bank. Views and opinions expressed in the adaptation are the sole
responsibility of the author or authors of the adaptation and are not endorsed by The World Bank.
CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita) Carbon dioxide emissions are those stemming from
the burning of fossil fuels and the manufacture of cement. They include carbon dioxide produced
during consumption of solid, liquid, and gas fuels and gas flaring.
Domestic general government health expenditure (% of GDP) Domestic general govern-
ment health expenditure (% of GDP). Public expenditure on health from domestic sources as a
share of the economy as measured by GDP.
Domestic private health expenditure (% of current health expenditure) Domestic pri-
vate health expenditure (% of current health expenditure). Share of current health expenditures
funded from domestic private sources. Domestic private sources include funds from households,
corporations and non-profit organizations. Such expenditures can be either prepaid to voluntary
health insurance or paid directly to healthcare providers.
GDP per capita (constant 2010 US dollar) GDP per capita is gross domestic product di-
vided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the
economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products.
It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion
and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars.
GDP per capita growth (annual %) Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based
on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GDP per capita
is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP at purchaser’s prices is the sum of
gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any
subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources.
School enrollment, secondary, female (% gross) Total female enrollment in secondary edu-
cation, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the female population of official secondary
education age. GER can exceed 100% due to the inclusion of over-aged and under-aged students
because of early or late school entrance and grade repetition.
School enrollment, tertiary (% gross) Total enrollment in tertiary education (ISCED 5 to
8), regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the total population of the five-year age group
following on from secondary school leaving.
GINI index (World Bank estimate) Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution
of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within
an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative
percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with
the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve
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and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under
the line. Thus a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect
inequality.
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years
a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay
the same throughout its life.
Lifetime risk of maternal death (%) Life time risk of maternal death is the probability that a
15-year-old female will die eventually from a maternal cause assuming that current levels of fertil-
ity and mortality (including maternal mortality) do not change in the future, taking into account
competing causes of death.
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) Infant mortality rate is the number of infants
dying before reaching one year of age, per 1,000 live births in a given year.
Tax revenue (% of GDP) Tax revenue refers to compulsory transfers to the central government
for public purposes. Certain compulsory transfers such as fines, penalties, and most social secu-
rity contributions are excluded. Refunds and corrections of erroneously collected tax revenue are
treated as negative revenue.
Note: The value for San Marino for 1995 was extremely high (44326) and has been recoded
to missing.
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World Economic Forum
http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-index-2017-2018/downloads/
(Downloaded on 2018-11-27)
Dataset: Global Competitiveness Report 2017-2018 The Global Competitiveness Index
4.0 assesses the competitiveness landscape of 140 economies, measuring national competitive-
ness—defined as the set of institutions, policies and factors that determine the level of productivity.
The Report presents information and data that were compiled and/or collected by the World Eco-
nomic Forum organized into 12 pillars: Institutions, Infrastructure, ICT adoption, Macroeconomic
Stability, Health, Skills, Product Market, Labor Market, Financial System, Market Size, Business
Dynamism, and Innovation Capabilities.
The new methodology is presented in the report of 2018, while also back casting the scores for 2017.
Organized crime. 1-7 (best) Organized crime. 1-7 (best). In your country, to what extent
does organized crime (mafia-oriented racketeering, extortion) impose costs on businesses? [1 =
to a great extent—imposes huge costs; 7 = not at all—imposes no costs] Original sources: World
Economic Forum, Executive Opinion Survey
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World Health Organization
http://www.who.int/gho/database/en/
(Downloaded on 2018-11-28)
Dataset: Global Health Observatory data repository The GHO data repository is WHO’s
gateway to health-related statistics for its 194 Member States. It provides access to over 1000
indicators on priority health topics including mortality and burden of diseases, the Millennium De-
velopment Goals (child nutrition, child health, maternal and reproductive health, immunization,
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, neglected diseases, water and sanitation), non communicable
diseases and risk factors, epidemic-prone diseases, health systems, environmental health, violence
and injuries, equity among others.
Alcohol consumption per capita (2010-) Alcohol consumption per capita (2010-)
Healthy Life Expectancy, Total Healthy Life Expectancy, Total
Infant mortality rate (probability of dying between birth and age 1 per 1000 liv Infant
mortality rate (probability of dying between birth and age 1 per 1000 liv
Estimated road traffic death rate (per 100 000 population) Estimated road traffic death
rate (per 100 000 population)
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World Values Survey / European Values Survey
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/
(Downloaded on 2018-09-12)
Dataset: World Values Survey dataset and European Values Studies dataset The
World Values Survey is a global network of social scientists studying changing values and their
impact on social and political life, led by an international team of scholars, with the WVS associ-
ation and secretariat headquartered in Stockholm, Sweden.
The variables are country averages calculated using the population weight provided by WVS/EVS.
Confidence: Parliament I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could
you tell me how much confidence you have in them: Parliament
1. None at all
2. Not very much
3. Quite a lot
4. A great deal
Feeling of happiness Taking all things together, would you say you are:
1. Not at all happy
2. Not very happy
3. Rather happy
4. Very happy
Satisfaction with your life All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole
these days?
1. Completely dissatisfied
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10. Completely satisfied
Most people can be trusted Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted
or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?
0. Need to be very careful
1. Most people can be trusted
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